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The Influence of Ownership Structures and Board Practices on Corporate Social 
Disclosures in a Developing Country 
 
  
 
Abstract 
In recent times the debate on „corporate social disclosures‟ (CSD) has become increasingly 
prominent in the social accounting and corporate governance literature. A host of studies 
has been conducted on CSD practices in developed countries. However, such studies are 
relatively rare in respect of developing countries. This study investigates whether ownership 
concentration and the imposition of regulation on corporate governance practices (including 
a change of board composition) influence voluntary CSD practices in developing countries. 
The results show that the imposition of regulation on corporate governance practices can 
significantly influence CSD practices in a developing country such as Bangladesh. 
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The Influence of Ownership Structures and Board Practices on Corporate Social 
Disclosures in a Developing Country 
 
 Introduction 
„Corporate social disclosures‟ (CSD) has become increasingly prominent in the social 
accounting and corporate governance literature. There is a host of studies conducted on 
CSD practices in the context of developed countries including Australia and New Zeeland 
(Guthrie and Mathews, 1985; Guthrie and Parker, 1989; Tilt, 1994; Hackston and Milne, 
1996; Deegan and Gordon, 1996; Deegan and Rankin, 1996; Hall, 2002); United States 
(Ernst and Ernst, 1978); Western Europe (Adams et al., 1998; Dierkes, 1980; Rey, 1980) 
and Japan (Yamagami and Kokubu, 1991; Stanwick and Stanwick, 2006)  The literature 
shows that in developed countries there is an increased awareness about CSD practices 
among different stakeholders. On the other hand, some literature has linked ownership 
structure and firm performance (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985;  Morck et al., 1988; Kim et al., 
1988; McConnel and Servaes, 1990; Han and Suk, 1998; Short and Keasey, 1999; Xu and 
Wang, 1999; Chen, 2001, Hovy et al., 2003; Yammeesri and Lodh, 2004; Sheu and Yang, 
2005; Yammeesri et al., 2006). However, these studies did not examine the associations 
between CSD practices, ownership concentration and imposed regulation of corporate 
governance practices.   
The literature on voluntary CSD is divided into two divergent theoretical underpinnings: 
from market-driven self-regulation (in a Milton Friedman‟s economic rationality sense), to 
pro-regulation. This study investigates whether ownership concentration and the imposition 
of regulation on corporate governance practices, including a change of board composition, 
influence voluntary CSD practices in developing countries. For example, Milton Friedman 
believed that the responsibility of business is to make profits and belongs solely to the 
individual outside the business community. Being a supporter of the free-market 
perspective, he adopted the purely agency theory perspective (Jensen and Meckling 1976) 
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and believed that any attempt to satisfy stakeholders, other than shareholders, is misguided 
(Solomon, 2007). However, such ideas of market-driven self-regulation are debated 
vigorously. It is argued that business has the responsibility to preserve the environment for 
continued profits; to become socially responsible and to have the basic sense to „clean up 
the mess‟ they made (Solomon and Martin, 2004, p 171). Therefore, there is increased 
concern about whether corporate entities are acting in a socially responsible manner. 
Accordingly, CSD practices have received an increasing amount of attention from 
academics, government, professional bodies, industries and corporations (Perera, 2007; 
Ghazali, 2007). CSD practices are seen as providing a solution to improved accountability 
for societal issues and have become an international issue (for example, global warming and 
climate change) (Elkington, 1997, Cheney, 2001; Hall, 2002).  
Following the recent high incidence of corporate collapses around the world (in particular, 
the collapses of Enron, WorldCom, HIH Insurance and) (see Clarke and Dean 2007), 
corporate governance reforms have emerged in several countries. A cause of these 
collapses has been alleged to the ethical consequence, rather than simply auditing failure 
(Parker, 2005; Gordon, 2007; Perera, 2007). This has given rise to the imposition of 
regulation and/or good corporate governance principle guidelines by several developed 
countries, for example, introduction of Serbanes-Oxley Act, 2002 in United States, Higgs 
Report, 2003 and Smith Report, 2003 in UK and CLERP9 in Australia.  
Mathews (1984, p.204) defines CSD in the corporate social and environmental research 
arena as: 
……voluntary disclosure of information both qualitative and 
quantitative, made by organizations to inform or influence a range of 
audiences. The qualitative disclosures may be financial or non-financial 
terms.  
Gray et al. (1987) define corporate social disclosure (CSD) or triple bottom line reporting 
as: 
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…the process of communicating the social and environmental effects of 
organizations' economic actions to particular interest groups within 
society and to society at large. (p ix) 
The World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD, 2000, p.10) proposed a 
broader understanding of the concept, emphasizing the balance between sustainable 
economic development as well as working with employees, their families, the local 
community and society. The Council further states that the commitment of business is to 
contribute to sustainable economic development, working with employees, their families, 
the local community and society at large to improve their quality of life. 
The emergence of CSD can be traced back to the early 1960s and 1970s in industrialized 
countries. In the last two decades or so, following the growing criticisms of industries by 
external pressure groups, the issue of good corporate governance has become a prominent 
global agenda (Burke, 1984; Yamagami and Kokubu, 1991; Tilt, 1994). Various influential 
standards and guidelines exist in developed countries, including Global Reporting Initiatives 
(GRI), ISO 14001, AA1000, and the International Standard on Assurance Engagements 
(ISAE) 3000. An important question remains whether such disclosures are occurring in 
developing countries. It is considered to be a new phenomenon in developing countries and 
law does not require such disclosures to be made; even though the need for them is acute 
(Gray et al., 1996). 
Milne (2007) argues that social research accounting “should concentrate on the extent of 
disclosure, relationship between disclosure and other variables (e.g., size industry, market 
price), the audit of disclosures and view of participants”. (p.50). He further argues that 
other than disclosure practices, there are numerous studies that also have analyzed the 
relationships on various firm characteristics over the last two decades. 
In the context of developing countries, there are several studies conducted on CSD 
practices (Singh and Ahuja 1983, Teoh and Thong, 1984; Andrew et al., 1989; Savage et 
al., 1994; Hegde et al. 1997; Imam, 2000; Belal, 2001; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Haniffa 
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and Cooke 2005; Kuasirikun and Sherer, 2004; De Villiers et al., 2006). However, CSD in 
the context of Bangladesh were studied by Imam (2000) and Belal (2001). Most of these 
studies examined the extent of corporate social disclosures, rather than examine the 
relationship between CSD practices and corporate governance attributes. This study, 
therefore, investigates whether ownership concentration and the imposition of regulation on 
corporate governance practices (including a change of board composition) influences 
voluntary CSD practices in a developing country context in Bangladesh. 
Section two outlines the background literature and theoretical framework on CSD practices. 
Section three illustrates the context of CSD practices in Bangladesh. The method and 
hypotheses are developed in the subsequent section. A note on data collection and research 
method is outlined in section five. Empirical results are interpreted in the following section. 
A conclusion is drawn in the final section. 
Background Literature on CSD Practices 
The issue of business social responsibilities and to what extent businesses should make 
social disclosures has been debated for over the last few decades (Milne 2007).  Numerous 
theories have dominated CSD research. A few of these theoretical underpinnings are 
discussed below. 
Market Driven Forces and Regulation 
This perspective suggests that the market or economic forces will motivate managers to 
provide information (such as, CSD) even in the absence of regulation (Deegan, 2006). The 
market forces will lead corporations to provide socially oriented information that may 
influence the share price and returns, and will be in line with modern management 
(Mathews, 1995). Contrary to this view, the pro-regulation perspective suggests that 
regulation is required and the market might not always work in the best interest of society:  
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Over the years there have been many arguments and debates over the 
necessity for regulation. Those who believe in the efficacy of markets 
argue that regulation is not necessary as market forces will operate to 
best serve society and optimise the allocation of resources. However, 
there are many who point out that markets do not always operate in 
the best interests of societies, so some form of intervention in the 
form of regulation is necessary (Gaffikin 2005, p.1).  
Stakeholder Theory 
The concept of corporate social disclosure has been alleged to arise consistent with 
stakeholder theory, and the suggestion that companies should disclose environmental and 
social issues in addition to their financial reporting (Solomon, 2007, p.250). This perspective 
suggests that financial matters should not be the only consideration - there are moral 
obligations that should never be abandoned whatever the circumstances that an 
organisation faces (Solomon and Martin, 2004). Therefore, rather than to maximize the 
interest of the shareholders only, stakeholder theory suggests that the interest of the wider 
community involved in corporations (such as employees, customers and suppliers, 
communities and even the environment) is to be satisfied (Freeman, 1984; Blair 1995; 
Maher and Anderson, 1999; Stovall et al., 2004). Compliance of such obligation (or social 
responsibility) ranges from profit maximization to social awareness and community service 
(Lantos, 2001). 
Social Contract, Accountability and Organizational Legitimacy 
Corporate social responsibility also arises to provide greater accountability, which can be 
considered a social contract in a legitimacy sense. This assumes that corporations act within 
the bounds and norms of society (Mathews, 1995; Gray et al., 1998; Deegan, 2005). 
According to De Villiers et al. (2006, p.763) "corporations will do whatever they regard as 
necessary in order to preserve their image of a legitimate business with legitimate aims and 
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methods of achieving it". Therefore, it is expected that corporations in developing countries 
will publish voluntary social and environmental information to ensure legitimacy. 
This study is conducted with a pro-regulation perspective.  It assumes that companies will 
not make any CSD voluntarily.  
The Corporate Social Disclosure Context in Bangladesh 
Bangladesh is a developing country in Asia.   The population of Bangladesh during the year 
ended 30th June 2007 was approximately 141.8 million, making it the eighth most populous 
nation in the world and one of the most densely populated, with more than 916 people per 
square kilometre (Index of Economic Freedom, 2008). Therefore, living standards are 
increasing concerns in Bangladesh. Moreover, due to increased industrialization and growing 
foreign investment there are some adverse impacts on the environment. The river 
Buriganga, on the bank of which the capital city Dhaka stands, became „clinically dead‟ as 
most of the industries are either on its banks (Belal, 2001) or the industrial waste ultimately 
flows in it. Due to industrialization, industries occupy cultivable fertile lands and industries 
dispose of wastes to the nearby fertile lands (causing the loss of fertility) and the 
waterways.   However, there are neither active external pressure groups nor regulations 
requiring firms to make such disclosure. Foreign investors may not consider investing in 
Bangladesh companies that are not socially and ethically responsible (Belal, 2001). 
Therefore, corporate social disclosure is an increased concern in Bangladesh. 
Corporate Governance Regulation in Bangladesh 
The United Kingdom Cadbury Report (Cadbury, 1992) defined corporate governance as the 
system by which companies are directed and controlled (p.15).  
OECD (1999) defines corporate governance as follows: 
… a set of relationships between a company‟s management, its board, its 
shareholders and other stakeholders (p 11).  
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Corporate governance also provides the structure through which objectives of the 
company are set, and the means of attaining those objectives and monitoring 
performance are determined… 
CLERP (1997) defines corporate governance as: 
… the rules and practices put in place within a company to manage information and 
economic incentive problems inherent in a separation of ownership from control in 
large enterprises. It deals with how, and to what extent, the interest of various 
agents involved in the company are reconciled and what checks and incentives are 
put in place to ensure that managers maximise the value of the investment made 
by shareholders… (p.62) 
Corporate governance suffers from being a multi-level concept which differs between 
country (or economy) and individual levels. However, following on the high degree of 
corporate collapses and scandals around the world over this decade, the corporate 
watchdog, the Securities and Exchange Commission of Bangladesh (SECB) announced the 
"Corporate Governance Notification 2006" for the listed firms on the Bangladeshi Stock 
Exchanges. This notification is probably the first published comprehensive set of corporate 
best practices governance guidelines in Bangladesh, and is a milestone of the corporate 
sector in Bangladesh. It requires compliance with the „board size‟ (which is 5 to 20 
members) and position of „independent‟ or non-shareholder directors‟ in the board (which is 
at least 10% of the total board members or minimum one). This independent or non-
shareholder directors should not have a significant material interest in the firms. 
Following the announcement of "Corporate Governance Notification 2006" for Bangladeshi 
firms, 21 companies immediately adopted (either fully or partly) such practices to maintain 
their images. However, such a notification does not require companies to report CSD. Even 
the Companies Act 1994, which guides corporate financial reporting in Bangladesh, does not 
require CSD to be reported in the disclosure document or corporate annual reports.  
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Companies which adopted the notification to change the board structure they made most of 
CSDs through the „Reports from the Board of Directors‟. No other form of disclosures, such 
as brochures, press releases, reporting on the web pages and separate social reports are to 
be found in the Bangladesh corporate sector. Most of the CSD reports are in the form of 
qualitative statements. Although the "Corporate Governance Notification 2006" does not 
require companies to make social disclosures in Bangladesh, it can be assumed that the 
firms which adopted the corporate governance best practices are also making CSD to 
maintain their organizational legitimacy. 
Hypotheses 
 Ownership Concentration and CSD Hypotheses 
Due to the separation of ownership and control in modern corporations (Berle and Means 
1932), there is a conflict of interest between the principal (owners) and the agent 
(management). The corporate ownership structure is one of the most important factors 
shaping the corporate governance system of any country. Ownership structures play an 
important role in determining a firm‟s objectives, shareholders‟ wealth and how managers of 
a firm are disciplined (Porter, 1990; Jensen, 2000; Yammeesri and Lodh 2004, Yammeesri 
et al., 2006). Further, ownership structures play an active role as a good monitor in 
countries where investor protection is weak (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; La Porta et al., 
1998; La Porta et al., 2000; Boubakri et al., 2005) and both the legal protection and some 
forms of concentrated ownership are essential elements of good corporate governance 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; La Porta et al., 1998). 
The corporate control mechanisms in Bangladesh are mostly insider oriented, including high 
family ownership concentration.  That is, the core investors own significant stakes of shares 
(also known as ownership control approach, see for example Xu and Wang, 1999) and, in 
general, are the board of directors. The spread of share ownership in public limited 
companies in Bangladesh is not wide and the economic power of businesses is concentrated 
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in dominant shareholder groups. A few shareholders account for a significant portion of total 
share value. There is evidence of a small ownership concentration by foreign investors, 
government and institutional investors. However, most public companies in Bangladesh are 
controlled mainly by founding sponsors/directors who are family members, leading to a very 
high degree of ownership concentration and control. Representatives of these concentrated 
owners hold positions on the company board and in management. 
In Bangladesh, institutional investors comprise of banks, insurance companies, pension 
funds, provident funds and mutual funds. They hold power over a substantial amount of 
invested capital and demand strong performance and transparent corporate governance. 
These institutional investors have a professional interest in developing the firm‟s corporate 
governance (Nandelstadh and Rosenberg, 2003), and can identify key indicators in 
determining performance in the emerging market. This is because they prefer to work inside 
the firms to change policies of firms in their portfolio (Baysinger and Butler, 1985, p.107; 
Gibson, 2003). Therefore, it is assumed that corporate ownership concentration can 
influence the firm‟s voluntary CSD. The following hypothesis is developed: 
H1:  There is a significant relationship between the corporate ownership 
structures and CSD reporting. 
 Board Composition and CSD Hypothesis 
The corporate board plays an important role in determining corporate governance 
mechanisms. One of the requirements of the "Corporate Governance Notification 2006" in 
Bangladesh is the appointment of outside independent directors to the board. The view is 
that such outside independent directors should have advance qualifications, expertise and 
experience. Thereby, they can effectively influence the board‟s decision and ultimately can 
add value to the firm (e.g., Fields and Keys, 2003) and wider community. Of course, any of 
these outside independent directors will not have enough inside operational information 
about the firm. 
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The Corporate Governance notification neither provided any legislative definition on 
independent directors nor any legislative requirements for their qualifications and guidelines 
for appointing them into the board. As a result, outside independent directors can be 
appointed in Bangladesh because of a close relationship with the family, existing board 
members, or a large shareholder. The UK Tyson Report 2003 recommends the appointment 
of non-executive directors with diversity in background, skills and experience to enhance 
board effectiveness and improve stakeholders' relationship.   
However, given the limitation on the appointment of independent directors, it is assumed 
there is a moral pressure for outside independent directors to respect the good governance 
principles advanced through launching the notification. Therefore, such an introduction of 
independent directors in the board structure may have some influence on the CSD practices 
in Bangladesh. The following hypothesis is developed: 
H2:  There is a significant relationship between the board composition in the form 
of representation of outside independent directors and CSD reporting. 
Research Method 
Sample Selection 
The sample companies were selected from the listed companies on the Dhaka Stock 
Exchange for the years ending 2004, 2005 and 2006. The sample is constructed on the 
basis of a company‟s highest market capitalization (e.g., Guthrie and Parker, 1990; Belal, 
2001) and compliance with the "Corporate Governance Notification 2006", in particular, 
companies which appointed independent directors. There were 239 listed companies as of 
30 June, 2006. Following the declaration of the "Corporate Governance Notification 2006", 
only a few companies adopted those guidelines and appointed independent directors. The 
companies which did not comply with such a requirement were excluded from the sample. 
Further, the companies for which market capitalization is less than BDT 50 million were also 
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excluded from the sample. It was assumed that these companies had little role in 
environmental sustainability exposure. After complying with all of these 21 companies were 
selected. The digitalized soft and hard copies of companies‟ annual reports were collected 
from the library of the Dhaka Stock Exchange. The sample consists of variety of industries: 
Cement (1), Ceramic (1), Engineering (3), Food and Allied (3), Fuel and Power (1), 
Pharmaceuticals and Chemicals (4), Service and Real Estate (1), Tannery Industries (3), 
Textile (3) and Miscellaneous (1). 
Dependent Variable 
CSD indices represent the dependent variable. It is measured in terms of different attributes 
reported in the company‟s annual reports (see Appendices A, B & C). Content analysis has 
been used commonly to measure a corporate social disclosure in annual reports (Admas et 
al., 1998; Ernst and Ernst, 1978; Guthrie and Mathews, 1985; Milne and Adler, 1999). 
Content analysis codifies the text (or content) of a piece of writing into various groups (or 
categories) depending on selected criteria (Weber, 1985). Following coding, quantitative 
scales are derived to permit further analysis (Milne and Adler, 1999). Content analysis 
assumes that the extent of disclosure can be taken as some indication of the importance of 
an issue to the reporting entity (Krippendorff, 1980). Content analysis requires objectivity 
and the specification of variables so that any item can be judged consistently as falling (or 
not falling) into a particular category (Guthrie and Mathews, 1985).  
Consistent with earlier studies on Corporate Social Responsibilty (e.g., Haniffa and Cooke, 
2002; Haniffa and Cooke, 2005; Ghazali, 2007), a checklist containing 20 items (shown in 
Appendices A and B) was constructed to assess the extent of CSD in annual reports. A 
dichotomous procedure was applied whereby a company is awarded a 1 if an item included 
in the checklist is disclosed, otherwise a 0 is awarded. The CSD index was derived by 
computing the ratio of actual scores awarded to the maximum score attainable (20) by that 
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company (Ghazali, 2007). More specifically, similar to Haniffa and Cooke (2005), the CSD 
index was calculated using the following equation: 
CSDi Index= 
j
nj
t ij
n
X 1
 
Where, 
CSDi index= Corporate Social Disclosure Index for i
th firm 
ni= Number of items expected for i
th firm, where n≤20 
Xij= 1, if j
th items are disclosed for firm i, otherwise 0 
Independent Variables 
The independent variables are ownership concentration and board composition. Consistent 
with some corporate governance studies (cf., Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Morck et al., 1988; 
Short and Keasey, 1999; Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001; Lins, 2003; Yammeesri and Lodh, 
2004; Yammeesri et al., 2006), this study defines the ownership structures as the 
percentage of shares held by different ownership categories. A variable, DIR, representing 
the percentage of shares held by directors/sponsors; INST, representing the percentage of 
shares held by institutions and LB, representing the percentage of shares held by the 
largest block holders is considered.  
Similarly, consistent with some other corporate governance studies (e.g., Rechner and 
Dalton, 1986; Zahra and Stanton, 1988), board composition, BC, refers to the percentage 
of seats held by the outsiders or independent directors. 
Control Variables 
Four control variables (company size, profitability, company age, and debt) are considered. 
Company size is considered to be an important factor in voluntary CSD and larger 
companies are more sensible towards CSD (Guthrie and Matthews, 1985); larger companies 
are subject to greater scrutiny by various interested groups (Haniffa and Cooke, 2005; 
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Ghazali, 2007). Company size is considered as the natural log of market capitalization 
(Ghazali, 2007). Therefore a variable LnMC is considered.  Ghazali, (2007) argues that 
companies make more disclosures to signal performance.  This study considers ROA as the 
profitability measure to examine firms‟ performance. Also, consistent with Yammeesri et al. 
(2006) and Yammeesri and Lodh (2004), a variable ROA is calculated by dividing earnings 
before interest and taxes (EBIT) by closing assets. The firms listed for a longer period will 
be sensible towards more disclosure as well. Therefore, a variable AGE is considered for the 
number of years a firm is listed on the stock exchange. Moreover, debt is an important 
instrument. It enables voluntary CSD to indicate the creditors that management is less 
likely to bypass their covenant claim (Haniffa and Cooke, 2005). Therefore, consistent with 
Haniffa and Cooke (2005) and Yammeesri et al. (2006), a variable DEBT is considered as 
the ratio of total debt to total assets. 
Empirical Results 
The descriptive statistics for the variables are provided in Tables 1, 2 & 3 for pre-
notification, post notification, and all observations (i.e., pre-and post corporate governance 
notification 2006 for Bangladeshi firms for the period from 2003 to 2006) as follows:   
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of the samples (pre-notification period) 
Variables Mean Median Standard  
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum Skewness Kurtosis Jarque-
Bera 
Probability 
Corporate 
Social 
Disclosure 
0.143 0.125 0.097 0.000 0.350 0.348 2.001 2.594 0.273 
Director 
Share 
Ownership 
0.451 0.440 0.175 0.010 0.800 0.178 3.414 1.036 0.596 
Institution 
Share 
Ownership 
0.183 0.150 0.161 0.000 0.570 0.686 2.685 3.472 0.176 
Largest 
Block-holders 
0.457 0.425 0.202 0.100 0.800 0.041 1.811 2.488 0.288 
Board 
Composition 
0.014 0.000 0.052 0.000 0.250 3.707 15.473 368.448 0.000 
LnMC 6.859 6.570 1.331 4.490 10.000 0.457 2.569 1.786 0.409 
ROA 0.097 0.085 0.057 0.020 0.240 0.865 3.080 5.244 0.073 
AGE 2.807 2.890 0.411 2.080 3.370 -0.436 1.846 3.664 0.160 
DEBT 0.336 0.330 0.200 0.000 0.760 0.178 1.951 2.147 0.342 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics of the samples (Post-notification period) 
 
Variables Mean Median 
Standard  
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum Skewness Kurtosis 
Jarque-
Bera 
Probability 
Corporate 
Social 
Disclosure 
0.218 0.200 0.126 0.000 0.450 0.019 2.035 0.778 0.678 
Director Share 
Ownership 
0.448 0.375 0.183 0.010 0.800 -0.271 3.217 0.285 0.867 
Institution 
Share 
Ownership 
0.197 0.160 0.157 0.000 0.540 0.652 2.824 1.442 0.486 
Largest Block-
holders 
0.454 0.450 0.210 0.080 0.800 0.005 1.897 1.014 0.602 
Board 
Composition 
0.164 0.167 0.054 0.083 0.333 1.348 6.026 13.688 0.001 
LnMC 6.720 6.405 1.332 4.320 9.470 0.318 2.312 0.731 0.694 
ROA 0.109 0.095 0.055 0.020 0.220 0.521 2.358 1.250 0.535 
AGE 2.905 3.000 0.387 2.300 3.400 -0.411 1.725 1.918 0.383 
DEBT 0.350 0.375 0.184 0.070 0.660 -0.019 1.789 1.224 0.542 
 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics of all samples (pre-and post notification periods) 
Variables Mean Median 
Standard  
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum Skewness Kurtosis 
Jarque-
Bera 
Probability 
Corporate 
Social 
Disclosure 
0.165 0.150 0.112 0.000 0.450 0.422 2.285 3.217 0.200 
Director 
Share 
Ownership 
0.447 0.440 0.176 0.010 0.800 -0.269 3.270 0.952 0.621 
Institution 
Share 
Ownership 
0.184 0.150 0.159 0.000 0.570 0.684 2.725 5.106 0.078 
Largest 
Block-holders 
0.460 0.430 0.204 0.080 0.800 -0.003 1.821 3.648 0.161 
Board 
Composition 
0.063 0.000 0.087 0.000 0.333 0.993 2.846 10.420 0.005 
LnMC 6.816 6.530 1.311 4.320 10.000 0.411 2.542 2.326 0.313 
ROA 0.101 0.090 0.056 0.020 0.240 0.730 2.821 5.672 0.059 
AGE 2.838 2.940 0.400 2.080 3.400 -0.446 1.903 5.249 0.072 
DEBT 0.335 0.340 0.196 0.000 0.760 0.119 1.909 3.274 0.195 
 
These results reveal that the mean of the dependent variable for CSD has increased from 
14.3% (pre-notification in Table 2) to 21.8% (after the notification in early 2006 in Table 
3). The mean for the directors share ownership independent variable has declined slightly 
from 45.1% to 44.8%. The mean for institutional share ownership has increased from 
18.3% to 19.7% after the notification. The largest block holder‟s percentage has remained 
the same. The mean for the board composition independent variable has increased from 
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1.37% to 19.7%. This shows that after the corporate governance notification, board 
composition with independent directors has increased significantly for the sample companies 
in Bangladesh. All other control variables have a slight increase as well.    
Model for Analysis 
Following model is developed to conduct the empirical analysis1 and to test the hypotheses: 
itititititititititit DebtAgeROALnMCBCLBInstDIRCSD   87654321
Where, 
CSDit = Corporate Social Disclosure Index for i
th firm at time t 
DIRit  = the percentage of shares held by directors/sponsors for i
th firm at time t 
Instit  = the percentage of shares held by institutions for i
th firm at time t 
LBit  = the percentage of shares held by the largest block holders for i
th firm at 
   time t 
BCit  = the percentage of seats held by outside independent directors for i
th firm  
   at time t 
LnMCit = the natural log of market capitalization for i
th firm at time t 
ROAit  = the return on assets for i
th firm at time t 
Ageit  = the number of years firm is listed in the stock exchange for i
th firm at time t 
Debtit  = the ratio of total debt to total assets for i
th firm at time t 
 = the constant  
  = the regression coefficient and  
it  = the error term for i
th firm at time t  
The above model is regressed through E-Views 6.0 statistical software and by using Two-
Stage Least Square (2SLS) Regression2 analysis. 
Table 4 represents the analysis for pre-notification period, 2003-2004 and 2004-2005. 
Regression results for the pre-notification show that except for the market capitalization 
variable, LnMC, all other variables are not associated with the CSD variable. This indicates 
                                                 
1 Prior to develop this model correlation tests were also carried out to check the associations with the variables. It 
was revealed that prior to notification LB variable and DIR were highly positively correlated. But after the 
notification DIR and BC; and LnMC and DIR were highly positively correlated. 
2 The Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression test has also been carried out; however, it has not been shown here. 
A Two-stage regression analysis is also carried out by adding a dummy variable in the model (itDumit), but is 
apparent that there may be some interactive effects among the independent variables. 
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that the practice of making voluntary social disclosures was not significant prior to 
notification of the change of corporate governance practices in Bangladesh in early 2006. 
Table 4: Results of regression (observations pre- notification period) 
 Coefficients  t-statistic 
(Constant) -0.184  -1.217 
Director Share Ownership -0.154  -1.371 
Institution Share Ownership -0.042  -0.474 
Largest Block holders -0.023  -0.181 
Board Composition -0.301  -0.991 
LnMC 0.052 *** 3.232 
ROA -0.125  -0.369 
AGE 0.013  0.365 
DEBT 0.104  1.288 
R-squared 0.455   
Adjusted R-squared 0.323   
S.E. of Regression 0.080   
F-statistic 3.447   
Prob (F-statistic) 0.005   
Mean Dependent Variables 0.143   
S.D. Dependent Variables 0.097   
Sum Squared Residuals 0.209   
Durbin-Watson Statistics 2.222   
Second-Stage SSR 0.455   
*** At 1% level of significance and ** at 5% level and * at 10% level of significance respectively. 
Table 5: Results of regression (All observations – pre- and post Notification periods) 
 Coefficients  t-statistic 
(Constant) -0.283 ** -2.216 
Director Share Ownership -0.151 * -1.845 
Institution Share Ownership -0.068  -0.876 
Largest Block holders -0.090  -0.853 
Board Composition 0.359 *** 2.725 
LnMC 0.056 *** 4.075 
ROA 0.282  1.124 
AGE 0.031  0.967 
DEBT 0.143 ** 2.132 
R-squared 0.476   
Adjusted R-squared 0.398   
S.E. of Regression 0.087   
F-Statistic 6.128   
Prob (F-statistic) 0.000   
Mean Dependent Variables 0.165   
S.D. Dependent Variables 0.112   
Sum Squared Residuals 0.405   
Durbin-Watson Statistics 2.085   
Second-Stage SSR 0.405   
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*** At 1% level of significance, ** at 5% level of significance and * at 10% level of significance respectively. 
Table 5 represents the analysis for combined pre- and post samples. A significant 
relationship is revealed between board composition and corporate social disclosures 
(p<.01). The ownership concentration by family directors is also found to be associated with 
CSD after the imposition of the corporate governance notification (p<.10 level). This 
indicates that after the introduction of the outside independent directors in the board 
composition there has been a significant increase of CSD in Bangladesh.  
Implications of this study for developing countries 
Although it is not common for companies to have increased CSD reporting in developing 
countries, this study provides a greater awareness of such practices. Improved CSD practice 
has occurred as a consequence of the announcement of the Corporate Governance 
Notification 2006, in Bangladesh. Before this was announced, companies‟ managements 
were dominated (mostly) by family shareholders. Representatives of family shareholders 
held the position in the company board who might not have urged for CSD to comply with 
organizational legitimacy and accountability to wider community. Outside directors have 
played a role in changing the attitudes of the family owners towards improved CSD 
practices in a developing country context. 
Limitations of this study 
 The data are collected from a large number of observations of different corporate entities. 
Those data ignore underlying differences in organizations: in no two organizations are the 
same (Deegan, 2006). The small sample size may not be representative as there is no 
control on the sample due to non-compliance of corporate governance best practices by 
large firms in Bangladesh. 
 
 
 20 
Conclusion 
Although it is necessary to evaluate the quality and the reliability of the information 
presented in corporate annual reports, the study identified that the imposition of good 
corporate governance control mechanism influence corporate voluntary disclosure practices. 
Corporate ownership structures somehow influence CSD, but board composition does 
influence the CSD practices in an improved way in a developing country, such as in 
Bangladesh.  This study supports the neo-institutional perspective of pro-regulation.  This 
argues that without regulation, there are no incentives for companies to provide voluntary 
social disclosure, especially in a developing country context. Therefore, the regulatory body 
can consider requiring the companies to make a minimum level of compulsory disclosure.   
A further study can be carried out by increasing the analysis period from one year to a few 
more years for the period of post „Corporate Governance Notification 2006‟ in Bangladesh, 
which will allow to increase the sample size as the more firms will adopt the good corporate 
governance notification.   
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Appendix A: CSD Checklist Status pre adoption of Corporate Governance Notification 
 
Disclosure Items 
Number of 
companies 
disclosed 
Percentage 
Disclosed 
Rank 
1 Community Involvement in General  9  42.86 1 
2 Charitable Donation 1  4.76 8 
3 Community Program (Health and Education) 3  14.29 6 
4 Environmental Protection 0  0 0 
5 Energy Savings 0  0 0 
6 Number of Employees 3  14.29 6 
7 Employee Relations 8  38.09 2 
8 Employee Welfare 1  4.76 8 
9 Employee Education 2  9.52 7 
10 Employee Training 6  28.57 4 
11 Employee Profit Sharing 0  0 0 
12 Occupational Health and Safety 2  9.52 7 
13 Types of Products Disclosed 7  33.33 3 
14 Product Quality and Improvements  6  28.57 4 
15 Product Safety 1  4.76 8 
16 Discussion of Marketing Network 4  19.05 5 
17 Focus on Customer Service 1  4.76 8 
18 Customer Award/Ratings Received 0  0 0 
19 Value Added Statement 8  38.09 2 
20 Value Added Data/Ratio 4  4.76 8 
 
Appendix B: CSD Checklist Status post adoption of Corporate Governance Notification 
 
Disclosure Items 
Number of 
companies 
disclosed 
Percentage 
Disclosed 
Rank 
1 Community Involvement in General  10  47.62 2 
2 Charitable Donation 0  0  12 
3 Community Program (Health and Education) 5  23.81  7 
4 Environmental Protection 0  0  12 
5 Energy Savings 0  0  11 
6 Number of Employees 6  28.57  6 
7 Employee Relations 8  38.10  4 
8 Employee Welfare 2  9.52  10 
9 Employee Education 4  19.05  8 
10 Employee Training 7  33.33  5 
11 Employee Profit Sharing 0  0  12 
12 Occupational Health and Safety 3  14.29  9 
13 Types of Products Disclosed 9  42.86  3 
14 Product Quality and Improvements  11  52.38  1 
15 Product Safety 1  4.76  11 
16 Discussion of Marketing Network 6  28.57  6 
17 Focus on Customer Service 3  14.29  9 
18 Customer Award/Ratings Received 0  0  12 
19 Value Added Statement 8  38.10  4 
20 Value Added Data/Ratio 5  23.81  7 
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Appendix C: Specific wording counted in content analysis 
 Disclosure Items Specific Wording Counted 
1 Community Involvement in 
General 
If there are wordings, such as „recognizing the 
importance of community‟.  
2 Charitable Donation If the company provided aid to the schools, colleges, 
educational and religious institution. 
3 Community Program 
(Health and Education) 
If the company organized any blood donation program. 
Adopting adult literacy program. 
4 Environmental Protection Initiatives taken to protect the environment in general; 
less emission of carbon; not polluting the air and water. 
5 Energy Savings If the company used the energy efficient machinery, 
lamps. 
6 Number of Employees Company disclosed the number of employees, helping 
the society in reducing the unemployment. 
7 Employee Relations If the company recognized the employee relations in 
general; maintaining good understanding between the 
employees. 
8 Employee Welfare If the company provided employee residence, welfare to 
the family members. 
9 Employee Education If the company recognition of employee education, 
provided support for education. 
10 Employee Training If the company provided employment specific training. 
11 Employee Profit Sharing If the company is allowed the employee profit sharing in 
general, profit bonus etc. 
12 Occupational Health and 
Safety 
Company took the precautionary measures in the 
workplace; proving OHS training in the workplace; 
available measure to cope with an accident. 
13 Types of Products Disclosed Types of products disclosed in general. 
14 Product Quality and 
Improvements 
Recognizing product quality, initiatives taken for 
improvements. 
15 Product Safety Explanation of product safety in general. 
16 Discussion of Marketing 
Network 
Discussion of marketing and distribution network in 
general. 
17 Focus on Customer Service Customer service in general. 
18 Customer Award/Ratings 
Received 
Recognition in the form of award received. 
19 Value Added Statement The company disclosed the value added statement in 
general. 
20 Value Added Data/Ratio The company disclosed the value Added Data/Ratio in 
general. 
 
